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14. During jury selection, Appellant challenged Juror No. 2, 
Sue Sanft, for cause. This juror was seated and served as foreperson. [It is 
uncontested that Harding challenged Mrs. Sanft for cause during voir dire in 
chambers because of very strong biases expressed in the Questionnaire and an 
oral voir dire. Immediately upon discovering that this challenge for cause was 
not included in the original record prepared for appeal, Appellant moved to 
supplement the record. The official transcript memorializing Appellant's 
challenge to Mrs. Sanft for cause has been prepared and either filed with this 
Court or awaits filing in the Fourth District Court. Though Harding holds an 
original copy of this transcript, she felt uncomfortable attaching it until it was 
officially included.] 
15. At trial, Dr. Bell openly argued that evidence of Appellant's 
conduct prior to consulting Dr. Bell should be considered as comparative 







REPLY POINT I 
- Significant Prejudice -
APPELLANT SUFFERED MATERIAL PREJUDICE AT 
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERRONEOUS DENIALS OF HER CHALLENGES FOR 
CAUSE. 
A. Introduction. 
When contesting ajury verdict for improprieties injury selection, 
a party must show that the trial court committed legal error by failing to 
dismiss a juror for cause and that the failure to strike prejudiced the losing 
party. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This Court should 
review the trial court's decision not to strike the three potential jurors for cause 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 
536 (Utah 1981). However, the Court should review the decision, "in light of 
the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by 
excusing the prospective juror and selecting another." Id. 
Prejudice may be shown by demonstrating multiple, cumulative 
errors in for-cause challenges: 
To that end, we will take into account on a cumulative basis all 
erroneous rulings with respect to rulings on voir dire and for-
-2-
cause challenges ku uie purposes of de termii ling vv 1 letl lei thei eis 
reversible error. 
added). Preji idice may a Iso be demonstrated by showing that, as a result of the 
erroneous failure to excuse on a for-cause challenge, a biased juror sat. State 
v. Wach 2001 UT 35 \ 40, 24 l\3d 948 at 957 (2001) ~" is may be shown by 
proving that a juror who actually sat had been challenged for cause. Id. at f^ 36. 
B. The Wach Standard, 
Dr. Beh icn^ nc,,s .iy on a new ca^. . ? „.:/z, bu. t ii rterpi e ts I I: far 
too narrow;; .. * , ... . ..; ,M J : , icrits t o r ;i pai l 1 , w I n c h 
a . i e y o „ . * • ' • : * Mill ing llll l \ i T i l l i 1 I h , 
I V * - „ v v ' M1^--1- *" : ; * • • - • —uieu ur severely limited Saunders 
i.'v! other recciu precedents b> Luio Couil dealing with for-cau.5L
 Jury 
challenges. This is unjustified. 
In Wach, the defendant was charged with kidnaping and assaulting 
his mother. During voir dire, the trial court asked wiicLi.L-rari) »•: i;;c r )i.e.;;^i 
jurors had been in\ol\ed m asimilarunik1 IIIIPI Ni* ' intln a(nJ she Iiatl been 
llir • iehni Il iiii assatill 1^  .i I'rnuli nnnivl.ii'n i' nmrnmale and ili'd the 
Q 
The trial court asked whether that experience would affect her ability to be fair 
and impartial and the juror's response was that it would not. Id. 
Juror No. 21 in Wach, when questioned about whether she had any 
experience in observing a criminal offense, answered that she worked at a 
hospital and then stated, "Well, I guess I am biased." Id. at % 17. The trial 
court attempted to rehabilitate the witness by asking her if she thought she 
could set her bias aside and the juror failed to respond. The court then briefly 
explained the presumption of innocence and the requirement of a unanimous 
verdict and then again asked the juror if she could set her perceived bias aside, 
to which she responded that she thought she could. Id. The trial court denied 
the defendant's challenges for cause as to both Juror Nos. 3 and 21. Id. at \ 18. 
Wach then used two of his four peremptory challenges to remove these jurors. 
Significantly, however, Wach did not seek additional voir dire of either juror, 
nor did he challenge for cause or indicate any displeasure with the other 
members of the jury as seated. Id. at ^ 17-18. In these respects, Wach is 
considerably different than the case sub judice, where additional voir dire 
exposed the bias yet further, and a sitting juror was challenged for cause. 
On appeal, Wach alleged that the failure of the trial court to strike 
the two jurors for cause forced him to use two of his peremptory challenges to 
strike jurors who should have been stricken for cause. The Supreme Court 
-4-
found that vv hile the ti ial cot lr tdid not abuse i ts disci e tion in • : • * errulh ig the 
s'-u 
been the victim of an assault, the circumstances surrounding the crimes were 
quite different, and the juror' s assurance of impartiality completely rebutted the 
initial indication of possible bias. However, the Court did find an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court's decision not to strike Turor \To 21 T--~x—e 
Russon keyed in on a vital excerpt of dialogue from the \ wii dire proceedings. 
The trial c^;iaSKea the prospective miors i.au .J.} w.-4*:i u i ^ 
F -
• - i s e . 
[Juror No. 21]: 
The Court 
[Juror No. 21]: 
The Court: 
[Juror No. 21]: 
The Court: 
1... have worked in hospitals for twenty years 
and-
Uh-huh. 
And I feel pretty strongly about that and 7 
don't - well, / guess I am biased 
I can appreciate that. Can you set it aside? 
(No response ) 
If you're selected as a juror, can you listen to 
the evidence? Again,, you know, nobody is 
guilty of anything at this stage. We have a 
great Constitution that says we all have a 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that is where 
we ask eight jurors to listen to the evidence 
and, based upon the evidence, reach whatever 
conclusion they deem appropriate. It has to 
be unanimous. And that will be discussed 
more as this case goes on. Can you or can 
you not? 
[Juror No. 21 ]: I believe I could. 
The Court: You think you could? 
[Juror No. 21]: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. 
Id. Thus, Juror No. 21 in Wach explicitly declared a bias, in very similar 
language to Jurors 11 and 7 in Harding. Juror No. 21 was "rehabilitated" by 
the court, in essence telling the juror how important it was to be fair ("we have 
a great Constitution . . . presumption of innocence . . . ," etc.), which is very 
comparable to the trial court's "rehabilitation" in Harding. The juror had life 
experiences in a hospital with those injured by criminal activity and thought 
she was biased. The Supreme Court found that the juror made statements that 
"facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, [and] an abuse of discretion 
occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court 
or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted." Id. at \ 27, 
954 (internal quotes omitted). Rebuttal is accomplished by a showing that the 
juror's statement was "merely the product of a light impression and not one 
that would close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in 
opposition." Id. (quotations omitted). 
With regard to Juror No. 21, the court found that "[a]statement 
made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its 
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meaning in light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias. " Id. at 
Tf 34, 955 (emphasis added). Even though the trial court twice asked the 
prospective juror whether she could objectively view the evidence, her faint 
assurance that she could, when viewed in light of her previous statement of 
bias did not give the trial court sufficient evidence to deny the challenge for 
cause. Id. Justice Russon noted: 
[Ajlthough juror No. 21 stated that she "believed" she could 
remain fair and impartial, her statement does not alter the fact that 
she indicated that as a result of her experience working at a 
hospital she had witnessed numerous instances of criminal 
behavior and was therefore "biased." 
Id. From this precedent, it is clear that a trial court's voir dire must go beyond 
simply asking a juror if she can set aside her stated bias and view the evidence 
objectively. The court must have sufficient evidence for its independent 
finding that the prospective juror can be impartial. 
C. Challenges for Cause - Admissions of Bias by 
Social and Family Ties to the Defense, 
In the case at hand, three prospective jurors were biased because 
of family and social ties directly to the defendant. The quality and impact of 
this "personal favoritism" type bias is potentially far more prejudicial to the 
concept of a fair trial than general life experiences by the two challenged jurors 
in Wach. Two of these Harding jurors, Nos. 11 and 7, openly admitted that 
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they were biased. No. 11, Mrs. Todd, would maybe "tend to favor [the chief 
defense liability expert's] testimony" as opposed to someone who had a 
different view because the defense expert was her second cousin, and she was 
very close to the doctor's mother, her first cousin. See Fact 2, Appellant's 
Brief at 5-6. Juror No. 7, Mrs. Vance, had numerous close social and school 
associations with Dr. Bell's wife and daughter because the juror's daughter 
was in the same elementary school class with Dr. Bell's daughter. Mrs. Vance 
associated with Dr. Bell's wife in the PTA, and had even been on a school-
sponsored overnight activity with Dr. Bell's wife and their respective 
daughters. Further, if she were called to serve, "I may feel inhibited around his 
family in the future." R. 1411:8-:3-12. She twice stated that she might tend 
to "favor his testimony" and could not "guarantee" that she could be fair, 
before she was "rehabilitated." Fact 3, Appellant's Brief at 7-8; 
R. 1410:20:20-24. This type of personal association and bias is definitely the 
product of more than a "light impression." It would surely tend to "close the 
mind" of the juror to the other side. There was no need to pick this juror. 
Juror No. 11, a second cousin of the principal defense expert 
witness, Dr. Kim Bateman, repeatedly admitted bias, yet the trial court failed 
to resolve the issue. Mrs. Todd was "very close" and first cousin to the 
-8-
witness's mother (R. 1410:16:19-21; 20:9); had heard other people including 
the mother make favorable comments about the witness (R. 1410:20:10-12); 
and had "a very high opinion of him." R. 1410:20:13-17. Given these 
circumstances, even an express acknowledgment by Juror No. 11 that she 
could be impartial should have been rejected by the trial court. The trial court 
did not successfully rebut the presumption of bias that such an admission 
raises. Indeed, given these facts any statement by Juror No. 11 that she could 
view the evidence impartially meant very little. In light of the fact that another 
juror could easily have been substituted, the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying plaintiffs challenge for cause. 
Juror No. 12 (Marilyn Wursten) admitted that her best friend was 
a current patient of Dr. Bell's. R. 1411:29:14-15; R. 1423. This social 
relationship clearly demonstrated her bias as well. She also admitted receiving 
favorable information about Dr. Bell through her friend. Fact 4, Appellant's 
Brief. This social tie to the defendant shows an ongoing risk that Ms. Wursten 
could not be impartial despite her claim to the contrary. Clearly, information 
she received from a trusted friend made her predisposed to favor the defendant 
and give more credibility to his testimony. 
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The indicia of bias in Harding are far stronger than those shown 
by the jurors in Wach because personal, family, or social ties are inherent 
characteristics which have a fundamental impact on how jurors view facts and 
assess credibility. The Wach jurors were only challenged because they had life 
experiences that may indicate bias. Obviously, a juror who is directly related 
to a key defense witness and who is close to the witness's mother has a far 
greater potential for bias favoring the credibility of that witness than a juror 
who has only witnessed medical consequences of a crime similar to the one 
charged. Close family, social, and personal ties are seldom, if ever, "merely 
the product of a light impression and not one that would close the mind against 
the testimony that may be offered in opposition." Wach, 2001 UT 35 at ^ 27, 
24 P.3d at 954 (citations and quotations omitted). Family and friendship must 
truly be two of the strongest associations known to man. The inference of bias 
was never rebutted and it was error to not excuse all three for cause. 
D. Material Prejudice Shown, 
Being forced to use her three peremptory challenges on jurors 
with close family and social ties to the defense was prejudicial for two reasons: 
a) the cumulative effect of the errors; and b) biased jurors ultimately sat, one 
of whom was challenged for cause. Under the Wach standard, the complaining 
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party must show that it challenged a juror who actually sat to prove that there 
was prejudice. Wach, 2001 UT 35 at \ 36. As a result of the failure to dismiss 
Juror Nos. 7,11, and 12 (see Harding's Brief at 8), Appellant was forced to use 
her peremptory challenges to dismiss these jurors. This resulted in Juror Nos. 
1 and 2 sitting, one of whom was challenged for cause (No. 2), with the other 
(No. 1) strongly opposed by the Appellant. 
Appellant challenged Juror No. 2 (Mrs. Sanft) for cause, alleging 
strong biases. Fact 14. The challenge was denied and since Plaintiff had used 
all three of her peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors with 
family, social, or personal ties to the defendant, she was unable to remove Mrs. 
Sanft. R. 1192, 1207-6. As a result, Mrs. Sanft sat on the jury and, in fact, 
served as foreperson. R. 1207-4. This indicated that not only did Mrs. Sanft 
have the immediate influence of her one vote, but that she was looked on as a 
leader among the jurors and likely influenced the views of others. Plaintiff 
challenged Mrs. Sanft for cause because of her apparent bias, disfavoring 
awarding damages in personal injury suits. See Appellant's Brief at 26. This 
was the actual prejudice suffered by Harding. 
Dr. Bell rejects the idea that Harding may also demonstrate 
prejudice by showing the cumulative effect of the court's improper denial of 
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three for-cause challenges, implying that Saunders has been overruled or 
modified by Wach. Such is not the case. Saunders, a 1999 case, stands 
squarely for the proposition that prejudice may be shown by the "cumulative 
effect" of multiple erroneous for-cause rulings. The case was cited with 
approval in Wach at ^ f 37, fn. 4. Apparently, the only reason it was not applied 
in Wach was that there was only one for-cause error. Wach, f 37 ("Therefore, 
because this case involves only one erroneous for-cause ruling, Wach's 
cumulative error argument fails"). 
The jury panel in Harding was heavily skewed ideologically 
toward the defendant and plaintiff had no real ability to influence or balance 
its composition. 
REPLY POINT II 
- Appellant Appropriately Marshaled the Evidence — 
APPELLANT HAS SUCCESSFULLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWING INSUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE OF HER COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
The evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, 
considered without the irrelevant facts occurring before Jeri' s first appointment 
with Dr. Bell on January 13,1997. Dr. Bell makes a bevy of inaccurate claims 
regarding Appellant's insufficiency argument, where are addressed here. 
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A. Appellant Has Successfully Marshaled the Evidence. 
Dr. Bell criticizes Harding because she "fails to cite to the 
testimony of either of defendant's experts," and "did not even request 
transcription of the trial testimony of Dr. Ganellen, one of Dr. Bell's expert 
witnesses on the issues of negligence and causation." Bell's Brief at 16. 
Furthermore, Dr. Bell alleges that the testimony of plaintiff s expert witnesses, 
Drs. Icenogle and Rosenthal, was favorable "for the defense on cross-
examination," and also should have been marshaled on appeal. Id Dr. Bell 
misunderstands the requirement of marshaling evidence on appeal. 
The requirement of marshaling evidence on appeal is simply to 
collect the evidence "in support of the [challenged] verdict" and then 
demonstrate that it is insufficient when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30 \ 2, 25 P. 3d 985 (Utah 2001). The 
obligation is not to marshal evidence supporting a portion of the verdict 
favorable to the appellant, which obviously is not appealed. Nor is the 
obligation to marshal evidence favoring positions advocated by the appellee, 
but which are not relevant to the portion of the judgment appealed by Harding. 
In this case, both parties received, in part, a favorable verdict from 
the jury. Mrs. Harding obtained a jury verdict to the effect that Dr. Bell was 
-13-
45% at fault, and that his negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries. R. 
1049-51. That means that the jury believed Harding's evidence that Dr. Bell 
failed to meet the standard of care in treating a person with Ms. Harding's 
presenting symptoms. Appellant has no quarrel with this finding and is not 
appealing it. Therefore, she has no obligation to marshal evidence supporting 
this finding. Yet, Dr. Bell criticizes Ms. Harding for failure to marshal 
evidence "on the issues of negligence and causation." Yet, these are not issues 
in the case on appeal. 
Dr. Bell is understandably upset that he was also found negligent, 
but he did not appeal the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. Had Dr. 
Bell appealed this issue, it would begin his obligation to marshal the evidence 
in favor of a finding of negligence and causation against him, and then 
demonstrate that it was insufficient to show negligence and causation of Ms. 
Harding's heart attack. However, Dr. Bell has failed to appeal this issue and 
thus waived it. It is an irrelevant issue for Harding on appeal, where her claim 
is that there was insufficient evidence of her negligence, such that there was 
no basis at law to compare her non-negligent actions to the negligence of Dr. 
Bell, who was found by the jury to be negligent. Accordingly, there is no need 
to examine the transcript of testimony of Dr. Ganellen. His testimony dealt 
-14-
only with causation, but even if it had addressed negligence, it was obviously 
rejected by the jury because Dr. Bell was found negligent and a proximate 
cause. Harding has no obligation to marshal evidence of Dr. Bell's negligence 
because she is not appealing that favorable finding. 
Likewise, even if Harding's witnesses, Drs. Icenogle and 
Rosenthal, allegedly testified "favorably for the defense" on cross-
examination,1 as claimed by Dr. Bell, it would be irrelevant to this appeal. 
Such testimony would only go to the negligence and causation of Dr. Bell, 
which are not at issue here for the reasons set forth above. It is not incumbent 
on Appellant to exonerate Dr. Bell, as he claims. Bell's Brief at 17. 
B. Prior Evidence Improperly Considered in Determining 
Comparative Negligence, 
Appellant is only contesting the consideration of the evidence 
prior to January 13th in determining her comparative negligence. [Other 
evidence of lack of comparative negligence after 1/13/97 was addressed 
adequately in Appellant's main Brief] Dr. Bell's contention that evidence of 
Jeri's condition prior to January 13th should be considered for comparative 
negligence is a tautological nightmare designed to obfuscate valid legal 
precedent. Dr. Bell argues Harding's claim here is really a challenge to the 
1
 They didn't so testify. 
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trial court's ruling on admissibility of Jeri's prior history, which objection was 
"waived." Bell's Brief at 19. Not so. 
Harding is challenging the use of the "prior health history" for the 
determination of comparative negligence on her part. Dr. ESell's contention 
that Harding contests its "admission" is a gross mischaracterization of her 
argument. Bell's Brief at 19. Dr. Bell argues: 
According to Harding, her conduct prior to January 13, 1997, 
could not be a contributing factor in causing her injury and thus 
this evidence should not have been admitted and considered by 
the jury and, without this evidence, the jury could not have found 
any comparative negligence by Harding. Substantively, this is a 
challenge to the jury verdict based on the admission of evidence 
for consideration by the jury, not for insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
Bell's Brief at 19. Dr. Bell contends that because Harding did not object to 
"admission" of the evidence that the issue was improperly preserved. Id. at 20. 
Appellant is not complaining about admission of the evidence. To the 
contrary, Harding's medical history, including the occurrence on at the truck 
stop and her smoking, go directly to prove notice and thus negligence on the 
part of Dr. Bell for failing to assess her risk factors for heart attack and to 
diagnose and treat her unstable angina. Put in this context, the fact that 
Appellant herself introduced evidence of her smoking is of little significance. 
Bell's Brief at 19. Harding only contests the consideration of the evidence 
-16-
of prior health problems by the jury in determining her alleged comparative 
negligence. Harding's Brief at 33-38. 
This Court has solidly held that a professional may not invoke 
comparative negligence based on facts occurring before the professional was 
consulted. See Steiner Corp, v. Johnson & Higgins, 996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000). 
Harding has already thoroughly addressed this issue in her main brief. 
Appellant's Brief at 33-35. To allow Dr. Bell to use pre-visit evidence to show 
comparative fault would allow doctors to make an end run around virtually all 
claims of malpractice by claiming that something the patient did before 
consulting them was a greater cause of the harm. Of course, the result is 
absurd and cannot be allowed. It was unlawful for the jury to consider any 
facts regarding Harding's comparative negligence that occurred before January 
13, 1997. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the jury's finding of 
55% comparative negligence on Jeri' s part. The trial court should have granted 
Harding's motion for a directed verdict as to her lack of negligence. 
C. Dr. Bell Openly Argued That Prior Evidence 
Demonstrated Appellant's Negligence, 
Dr. Bell asserts that "evidence of Harding's smoking and other 
risk factors predating January 13,1997, was not introduced for the purpose of 
establishing comparative fault: This evidence was presented for the purpose 
-17-
of establishing damages and relevant medical issues." Bell's Brief at 20. This 
is disingenuous since Dr. Bell argued exactly the opposite at trial. For 
example, Dr. Bell argued that the pre-January 13th evidence, like the truck stop 
incident, clearly demonstrated Ms. Harding's comparative negligence: 
I think most people would agree, given the symptoms she 
described at the truck stop, that a reasonable person would go 
see the doctor that day; at a minimum you would go to an 
Instacare, an emergency room or go see your own doctor. Dr. 
Bell's number is listed in the phone book, his home number. But 
instead she doesn't do that. She goes up to Morgan and just 
completely decides she is not going to do anything on the 4th. 
Now the testimony is undisputed that after the 4th she continued 
to do all of her chores and had no chest pain. 
R. 1412:15:6-15 (Defense Closing Argument). Thus, Dr. Bell clearly intended 
that this pre-visit evidence be considered by the jury for comparative 
negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Harding was denied a fair trial because the trial court improperly 
refused to excuse three jurors that were challenged for cause. The focus of the 
for-cause challenges was personal bias in favor of Dr. Bell (and his only 
liability expert). This type of bias (family and friendship) is fair more ominous 
and less likely to be "rehabilitated" than the general life experience bias in 
Wach. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of three failures to excuse jurors 
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who should have been excused for cause was extremely prejudicial and 
devastating to Harding's case and denied her a fair trial. 
In order to prove insufficiency of the evidence in this case, 
Harding was required only to marshal and show the insufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the 55% liability verdict in favor of Dr. Bell. Harding is 
not required to marshal evidence opposing the 45% favorable verdict 
demonstrating Dr. Bell's negligence. Dr. Bell could have appealed the jury's 
verdict wherein he was found 45% at fault and a proximate cause of the 
damage, but he chose not to lodge such an appeal and therefore has waived any 
objection thereto. Had he lodged such an appeal, it would have been his 
burden to marshal the evidence supporting the 45% finding for Harding and 
show that it was insufficient to support that verdict. 
Additionally, it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to 
consider facts occurring prior to the visit to Dr. Bell for the purpose of 
comparative fault. The court should have granted Harding's motion for a 
directed verdict on this issue because there was no evidence that Harding was 
negligent. 
DATED this 19th day of Dumber , 2001. 
ROBERT B. SYKESjA^brney fbf Appellant 
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